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Abstract
Background: Visual working memory capacity is extremely limited and appears to be relatively immune to practice effects
or the use of explicit strategies. The recent discovery that visual working memory tasks, like verbal working memory tasks,
are subject to proactive interference, coupled with the fact that typical visual working memory tasks are particularly
conducive to proactive interference, suggests that visual working memory capacity may be systematically under-estimated.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Working memory capacity was probed behaviorally in adult humans both in laboratory
settings and via the Internet. Several experiments show that although the effect of proactive interference on visual working
memory is significant and can last over several trials, it only changes the capacity estimate by about 15%.
Conclusions/Significance: This study further confirms the sharp limitations on visual working memory capacity, both in
absolute terms and relative to verbal working memory. It is suggested that future research take these limitations into
account in understanding differences across a variety of tasks between human adults, prelinguistic infants and nonlinguistic
animals.
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Introduction
Visual working memory (WM) capacity–the amount of visual
information that can be stored over brief delays–is decidedly
underwhelming. Present an observer with two human faces to
remember over a brief delay. Then present the observer again
with two faces and ask if they both match the faces in the memory
set. Humans are well below ceiling on even this very minimal task
[1]. A small but intense debate has erupted in recent years over
whether humans can remember as many as four different
attributes (e.g., color, orientation, etc.) of four line segments over
a brief delay [2,3,4,5]. This obscures the fact that four attributes of
four line segments is not much.
These sharp limitations in WM for visual information are
particularly striking when surveying the literature on WM for
verbal information. Historically, very careful experimental manip-
ulations have been required to demonstrate that the capacity of
WM is only four chunks of verbal material and not more [6,7], in
stark contrast with the visual literature, where careful manipula-
tions are necessary to show that capacity is as many as four chunks
[2,3,4,5,8].
With training and the use of simple strategies, humans can be
taught to maintain lists of 80 to 90 words in WM [9,10]. I am
unaware of any studies of visual WM that reach even that order of
magnitude. Alvarez and Cavanagh suggest a theoretical upper
limit of five to six visual objects of minimal complexity, with the
number of objects decreasing as complexity increases [2].
Moreover, training studies typically report moderate improve-
ments in visual WM capacity at best, with a number of studies
showing no improvement [1,11,12,13,14,15].
In one particularly relevant study, Zhang and Simon [16] found
that literate Chinese observers could recall three times as many
easy-to-name Chinese characters than difficult-to-name Chinese
radicals (components of characters), even though the characters
actually included the tested radicals, making the former consid-
erably more visually complex. Though this study was not without
confounds [6], it is nonetheless striking. It moreover seems telling
that, in order to get a pure assessment of visual WM capacity,
researchers routinely employ strategies to prevent participants
from recoding the stimuli verbally and thus improving perfor-
mance [4,17]. I am not aware of a similar concern among
researchers that observers in verbal WM tasks may be using a
visual strategy.
Thus, it appears that visual WM capacity is quite limited, both
in absolute terms, and in comparison with verbal WM. However,
it remains to be shown that this capacity difference is not illusory.
The tasks used to probe verbal and visual WM capacity are
typically quite different (the Zhang and Simon study being a
notable exception). Verbal WM capacity is typically assessed by
having the observers reproduce the memory items orally or
through writing, whereas visual WM tasks typically involve
accepting or rejecting a test item as being a member of the
memory set (see below for further discussion of the implications).
Also, while the ability to maintain 4 extremely simple visual objects
appears to pale in comparison to maintaining 90 words, it may not
be appropriate to equate words and visual objects–either on the
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and representational resources to maintain) or on the level of
actionable information (i.e., which one is more useful to maintain in
WM).
Fully understanding the exact limits of visual WM capacity is a
non-trivial task. In this paper, I will address one particular
concern. Before introducing this study, I wish to give at least one
reason that WM capacity matters in addition to familiar questions
of understanding the nature of computation and the architecture
of the mind [6,7]. It has been noted [18] that language appears to
play an indirect role in a number of the differences between
linguistically competent adults on the one hand and pre-linguistic
infants or non-linguistic primates on the other. For instance, only
humans who have learned number words can represent large
numbers (e.g., 20, 200, or 2,000) exactly [19,20,21]. Similarly,
linguistically competent humans tend to pass standard false belief
tasks [22], while infants and non-human primates may not, and
language learning seems to directly predict this developmental
change in humans [23]. The use of certain navigational cues (e.g.,
left of the blue wall) in reorientation tasks seems to be likewise
restricted to linguistically competent humans, and it can be
eliminated by interfering with linguistic processing [18].
It has been claimed that the role of language in successful
performance of these and other tasks is to allow for the creation
and representation of new concepts crucial to the task [18]. In
contrast, I note that all these tasks have clear WM components. It
may well be that the role of language in these tasks is to increase
WM capacity, thus allowing participants to maintain crucial
information over a delay. Therefore, I believe that fully
understanding WM capacity for different modalities holds
important theoretical implications even beyond the crucial
questions of mental architecture.
In the present study, I investigated whether the rather poor
performance of visual WM typically reported is due to an outsized
effect of proactive interference. Proactive interference (PI) occurs
when processing on one trial negatively affects performance on a
subsequent trial [24,25]. In verbal tasks, it appears to be a major
cause of forgetting [24; see also 26]. Importantly, PI appears to be
a major factor in individual differences in verbal WM capacity
[27]. PI is particularly likely to happen when the test probe
matches an item from a previous memory set (‘‘item-specific
proactive interference’’), or when different stimuli appear on each
trial but are members of the same semantic category such as place
names (‘‘item-nonspecific proactive interference’’) [28,29]. The
relationship between the two types of PI is not clear, but both
appear to rely on a common neural substrate [28].
There are two reasons PI might lead to low visual WM capacity
estimates, both in absolute terms and relative to verbal WM. First,
the paradigmatic verbal WM task requires only a dozen or so trials
in order to establish capacity [30,31]. This is because the tasks use
whole-report: the participants repeat all the words from the
memory set. In contrast, visual WM tasks involve accepting or
rejecting a probe, in which case chance accuracy is 50%.
Researchers typically estimate capacity using a formula that
considers hits, correct rejections, and the number of stimuli in the
memory set [13,32]. Thus, many more trials are needed–
frequently hundreds–and each probe may be shown dozens of
times [3,5,8,33]. It is not known, even in the verbal domain, how
PI accumulates over hundreds of trials and dozens of presentations
of the same stimuli. If the ceiling for PI accumulation is high, poor
performance on visual WM tasks could be due to massive PI of a
degree simply not seen in verbal tasks.
Furthermore, it is possible that visual WM is particularly
susceptible to PI. Although some researchers have suggested that
PI may be a result of domain-general processes, neuroimaging
results are mixed [28,34,35].
Directly comparing verbal and visual PI in a quantified way is
difficult, as pointed out above, because matching stimuli across
modalities is a non-trivial task, and it is in any case beyond the
scope of the present study. In this study, I investigate to what
degree PI depresses estimates of visual WM capacity. Further-
more, as PI has only been very recently described in visual WM
[17,28,34,35], the experiments in this study also serve to more
thoroughly probe the nature of PI in visual WM tasks and consider
whether it shows the same behavioral signatures as verbal PI.
Overview of Experiments and Results
Experiment 1. Experiment 1 used a modified recent probes
paradigm, which was introduced in the verbal domain by Monsell
[36] and which has been used to show relatively small decrements
in visual WM performance due to item-specific PI [17,29,34,35].
In the standard version, several visual stimuli are displayed.
After a brief retention period, a probe is presented and the
observer responds as to whether the probe matches any of the
items in the memory set. The crucial manipulation is that in one
condition, the non-match probe matches a memory item on the
previous trial. In the other condition, the non-match probe is not
novel–constraints on the number of available stimuli prevent this
ideal manipulation–but at least has not been used in the current or
previous trial. Accuracy in the ‘‘recent probe’’ condition is
typically a few percentage points lower than in the ‘‘non-recent
probe’’ condition, which is instructive, but cannot possibly account
for low visual WM capacity estimates by itself.
These experiments were limited in that while the ‘‘non-recent
probe’’ did not appear on trial N-1 (the previous trial), it could–
and, in some experiments, almost certainly did–appear on trial N-
2 (the trial before last). Thus, the ‘‘non-recent probe’’ condition
itself may suffer from PI. (Given that all stimuli came from the
same semantic category, such as ‘‘faces,’’ the ‘‘non-recent probe’’
condition certainly suffered from item-nonspecific PI, something
that is not addressed in the present experiment, but is in
subsequent experiments.)
Experiment 1 used a modified recent probes paradigm, where
the ‘‘recent probe’’ on trial N could have most recently appeared
in trial N-1, N-2, N-3, N-4, N-5 or N-8. Again, there is no perfect
baseline with a completely novel probe, but this experiment will at
least give us a better sense of how stimulus-specific PI decays over
time.
In Experiment 1, I find that item-specific PI does last across 3–4
trials of an experiment and thus may be a larger factor than
previous experiments have suggested. However, it appears to
decay entirely within 4–5 trials, a fact which sets an upper bound
on the influence of item-specific PI.
Experiment 2. Experiment 2 estimates the combined effect
of item-specific and item-nonspecific PI on measured visual WM
capacity. Ten highly dissimilar but non-nameable stimulus sets
were assembled. Participants performed a change-detection task
similar to that in the previous experiment. Every 10 trials the
stimulus set switched. This way, the first trial with each stimulus set
(low item-specific and item-nonspecific PI condition) could be
contrasted with the 10
th trial using that stimulus set (high item-
specific and item-nonspecific PI condition). Importantly, Cowan’s
K (an estimate of capacity; see below) can be computed in both the
high- and low-PI conditions and directly compared.
Experiment 2a consisted of 6 blocks of 10 sets of the 10-trial
mini-blocks described above. In Experiment 2b, the order of the
trials was randomized for 3 of the 6 blocks, thus allowing a direct,
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low-PI condition, and a typical WM capacity experiment.
In Experiment 2, I find that measured visual WM capacity
declines 17% from the low-PI to the high-PI condition, with the
‘‘typical’’ condition producing results intermediate between the
two.
Experiment 3. Changing stimulus sets every 10 trials in
Experiment 2 should have led to reduced PI on the first trial of
each mini-block. The stimulus switch may also capture the
participants’ attention, causing them to pay more attention to the
first trial of each mini-block. Thus, improved performance on that
trial may be due to attention, not a reduction in PI. This is a
potential concern for all previous studies of item-nonspecific PI,
but it has not been explored.
Experiments 3a and 3b test this possibility. In Experiment 3a,
the stimuli changed color, but not shape, every 10 trials. In
Experiment 3b, participants were given a break after every 10
trials.
Neither experiment found any effect of the attentional
manipulations on measured visual WM capacity, suggesting that
the decline in measured WM capacity in Experiment 2 is indeed
due to the effects of PI.
Experiment 4. Experiment 2 estimates the effect of PI on
measured visual WM capacity, but does not use a truly PI-free
baseline. This is not a failing unique to this study; it is true of every
study of PI with visual material of which I am aware, and true of
many of the studies involving verbal material as well.
One possibility is to create a very large set of stimuli and only
use each stimulus once. This turns out to be impractical. If the
probe is sufficiently unlike any of the memory items (e.g., memory
items were letters, probe is a picture of an elephant), the task is
trivially easy. However, if the probes are too similar to the memory
items, discriminability becomes a problem [3]. Creating a
sufficiently large set of stimuli that are distinct enough yet not
too distinct may be an insurmountable problem, given the number
of trials required of each participant.
An alternate possibility is to recruit a very, very large number of
participants and test each on only a few trials. The first trial would
then be as close to PI-free as can be achieved. To have as much
data, measuring only the first trial per participant, as was collected
by averaging across trials in Experiment 2 requires 3,050
participants. Recruiting 3,050 participants in the lab is of course
impractical. However, it can be done over the Web.
Web-based experiments have been used for well over a decade
and are rapidly gaining acceptance. A recent review found that
21% of APA journals have published at least one paper relying on
Web-based research [37]. A couple studies have found that Web-
based experimental results agree well with laboratory-based results
[38,39].
However, most published Web-based experiments have been
questionnaires. Vision experiments typically involve careful
controls of display size, timing and other factors that cannot be
carefully controlled in a Web-based paradigm. That said, such
factors seem less important for the study at hand, though they may
increase the variability in the data. Thus, this experiment in some
aspects was also a trial run for vision and memory experiments on
the Internet.
In Experiment 4, I test 3,000+ participants in a visual WM task
in order to establish as close as possible a PI-free baseline (the first
trial). The results replicate Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting that
visual PI reaches asymptote within several trials, and while it has a
respectable and statistically significant effect on measured visual
WM capacity, the effect is not large enough (,12%) to explain
away the typical low estimates of visual WM capacity.
Methods
Experiment 1: Method
Participants. Participants in all experiments were volunteers
from Harvard University and the surrounding community, who
were compensated either with payment or course credit. All
human subject involvement was governed by the policies of
Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in
Research. In Experiments 1–3, participants read a description of
the experiment and gave written, signed consent. In Experiment 4,
the fully anonymous participants read a description of the
experiment and clicked a Web link to indicate consent. All
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity
and normal color vision. A total of 20 participants completed
Experiment 1.
Equipment. Participants in Experiments 1–3 were tested
individually in a normally lit interior room. They sat unrestricted
at about 57 cm away from a computer monitor. The experiments
were programmed with Psychophysics Toolbox implemented in
MATLAB [40,41].
Materials. Three sets of six stimuli were used: non-nameable
novel shapes, novel polygons [42], and blue fribbles from different
families (used with permission, Michael J. Tarr, http://www.
tarrlab.org). Shapes ranged from approximately 2u to 3.2u in
diameter and were displayed on a neutral gray background.
Stimuli from all experiments in this study can be found in
Appendix S1.
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 1 is shown in
Figure 1. Each trial began with 500 ms of fixation on a red
crosshair. Then three stimuli, one from each stimulus group, were
displayed equidistantly on an imaginary circle (radius=2.4u). This
memory set was displayed for 1000 ms. After a further 1000 ms of
fixation, a single test item was presented at the center of the screen
until a response was made. Participants were asked to press one of
two keys to report whether the test item matched one of the
memory items.
Each participant completed 700 experimental trials divided into
7 blocks. Within a block, stimuli from each stimulus group always
appeared in the same location, though these locations switched
randomly between blocks. On each block, for 40 of the trials (40%)
the probe matched one of the memory set items. On the other 60
trials (60%), the mismatch probes had been most recently used as a
memory item on trial N-1, N-2, N-3, N-4, N-5 or N-8. In all cases,
the test item had not been used in the meantime as a test item. On
each block, each mismatch condition occurred between 11 and
13 times (,10%). The N-8 condition serves as an imperfect
baseline.
In order to train participants on the task without exposing them
to the stimuli, practice trials involved stimuli highly dissimilar to
those used in the experiment. Participants received feedback on
incorrect responses only. To minimize verbal naming, participants
were required to rehearse a one-syllable word (specified at the
beginning of each block) as quickly as they could throughout the
block.
Experiment 2: Method
Participants. Twenty participants completed Experiment 2a.
Twenty-one participants completed Experiment 2b.
Materials. Ten stimulus groups of six objects each were
created. Three (non-nameable shapes, polygons and fribbles) were
used in Experiment 1. The others were faces, oriented lines,
rotated cubes, colored squares, line-drawings of houses, Sanskrit
letters, and rotated 2s, 5s, and 10s. Shapes ranged from
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 July 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 7 | e2716approximately 2u to 3.2u in diameter. The stimuli can be found in
Appendix S1.
Experiment 2a. The purpose of this experiment was to
compare visual WM capacity measures under low- and high-PI.
Each trial began with 500 ms of fixation on a red crosshair. Then,
four stimuli from a single stimulus group (e.g., faces) were displayed
around an imaginary circle (radius=3u) for 1000 ms. The memory
set was followed by a 1000 ms retention interval during which
participants fixated on the crosshair. Then, a test item was
presented. To minimize extraneous search and comparison
factors, the test item was presented in the location of one of the
memory set items. Participants were to respond as to whether it
matched the memory item that had been in that location. The test
item matched in 50% of trials. When it did not match (50%), it was
not the same as any of the memory items for that trial.
Each participant completed 600 trials, broken into blocks of
100. Each block consisted of 10 mini-blocks of 10 trials each.
There was no pause between mini-blocks. The same stimulus set
was used throughout a mini-block. No stimuli were used on more
than one mini-block per block. The order of the mini-blocks was
randomized on each block. The design of one block of Experiment
2a is given in Figure 2.
Figure 1. Design of Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002716.g001
Figure 2. The design of one block of Experiment 2a. Experiment 2b was created by randomizing the trial order for 3 of the 6 blocks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002716.g002
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not explicitly controlled to have appeared on any particular previous
trial. This was done in order to reflect a typical visual WM
experiment. On trial 1 of a mini-block, a no-match test item was
alwaysnovel,at least within that particular100-trialblock. Ontrial10,
a no-match test item was 89% likely to have appeared on trials 8 or 9,
and 96% likely to have appeared within the last three trials. Practice,
feedback and articulatory suppression were as in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2b. The procedure for Experiment 2b was a
modification of Experiment 2a, where the trial order was
randomized for three of the six blocks, thus disrupting the
‘‘mini-block’’ design for those three blocks, leaving the other three
unchanged. Thus, the blocked condition was identical to
Experiment 2a and should exhibit increasing PI across each
‘‘mini-block’’. The randomized condition should exhibit minimal PI.
Otherwise, the method of the two experiments was identical.
Experiment 3: Method
Participants. Twenty participants completed Experiment 3a.
Ten participants completed Experiment 3b.
Materials. All stimuli were from the non-nameable novel
shapes group. In Experiment 3a, ten different colors were used,
creating ten monochromatic stimulus groups. In Experiment 3b,
as in the previous experiments, all six shapes were gray.
Experiment 3a. The procedure was identical to Experiment
2a in all ways except that the ten stimulus groups used ten
differently-colored versions of the non-nameable novel shapes.
Each stimulus group was monochromatic. Thus, the stimuli on the
first trial of each block were novel by virtue of having a new color
relative to the previous trial (the high-novelty condition). On the 10
th
trial, the stimuli are far less novel (the low-novelty condition).
Experiment 3b. The procedure was identical to Experiment
3a with two exceptions. The color of the stimuli was grey and did
not change between mini-blocks. Instead, participants were given
a short pause between each mini-block and told to press the
spacebar when they were ready to continue, effectively creating 60
identical blocks of 10 trials each. Thus, on trial 1 of each block,
participants were relatively refreshed (the refreshed condition), while
by trial 10 they are likely to be more fatigued (the fatigued condition).
Experiment 4: Method
Participants. Participants were anonymous volunteers
recruited via the Internet (www.vacognition.wjh.harvard.edu).
Consent followed the same procedure as in the above
experiments, except that the participants clicked a link to
indicate consent. A total of 3,185 first-time participants 18–40
years old who reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision
completed the experiment.
Equipment. The experiment was programmed in Flash MX.
The program downloaded in its entirety before running. Data was
recorded in a MySQL database via PHP. Participants were asked
to be in a quiet environment where they would not be distracted
for the duration of the experiment (about 5 minutes).
Materials. Stimuli were six non-nameable novel objects used
in the previous experiments and shown at the bottom of Appendix
S1. Shapes ranged from approximately 60660 pixels in diameter
and were displayed on a neutral gray background 5006400 pixels
in size.
Procedure. Each trial began with 500 ms of fixation. Four
stimuli were displayed around an imaginary circle 75 pixels in
radius for 1000 ms, followed by a further 1000 ms of fixation. A
test item appeared in one of the four previously-occupied
locations. Participants used their mouse to click a button to
indicate whether the test item matched or did not match the
memory item that was in that location.
The experiment, which consisted of 40 trials in a single block,
was preceded by 10 trials of practice (which participants could
repeat if desired). Practice stimuli (Greebles, used with permission
from Michael J. Tarr, http://www.tarrlab.org) were highly
dissimilar from the experimental stimuli. The practice stimuli
were also more challenging in order to encourage the participants
to pay attention. Participants could repeat the practice session, but
most did not. Participants received feedback only on incorrect
responses. Articulatory suppression was induced by asking
participants to repeat a one-syllable word out loud during the
entire block. An archive of the experiment is maintained at the
website (http://www.coglanglab.org/VSTMTime/).
Results
Experiment 1: Results
Participants correctly accepted the test item in match trials 78%
of the time (SD=13%). The false alarm rate in the six no-match
conditions is given in Figure 3. The six conditions differed
significantly (F(1,19)=9.22, p,.001). Participants were signifi-
cantly more accurate in the N-8 (,baseline) condition than in the
Figure 3. Experiment 1: False alarm rates (with standard errors) across as a function of probe’s last presentation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002716.g003
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conditions (t(19)=3.07, p=.006). Participants were non-signifi-
cantly more accurate in the N-4 (t(19),1) and N-5 (t(19)=1.66,
p=.11) conditions.
Thus, Experiment 1 does show that item-specific PI requires at
least several trials to decay. This suggests that in a typical
experiment with many trials and small numbers of stimuli, it is
quite likely that all non-match probes are ‘‘recent probes,’’ and
thus subject to item-specific PI. This suggests that item-specific PI
could in fact play an important role in determining estimates of
visual WM capacity.
On the other hand, the effects shown in this experiment are not
large and do not suggest that eliminating PI would dramatically
increase measured visual WM capacity. That said, all our
conditions are subject to considerable item-nonspecific PI. In
Experiment 2, we get a cleaner measure of visual WM capacity
absent PI.
Experiment 2: Results
Experiment 2a. Mean accuracy across the 10 mini-block
trials is given in Figure 4. Analyses on accuracy, d-prime and a-
prime all gave similar results; only accuracy analyses are reported.
A planned paired t-test between the first trial (low-PI) and the
tenth (high-PI) was significant (t(19)=2.20, p=.04) in the
predicted direction.
Capacity of visual short-term memory can be estimated using
Cowan’s K: (hit rate+correct rejection rate–1) * number of items to
be remembered [13,32]. Using this formula, measured capacity
decreased from 1.8 (SD=0.5) on the first trial of each mini-block
to 1.5 (SD=0.7) on the tenth trial. This difference was significant
(t(19)=2.20, p=.04). This reduction was due entirely to an
increase in false alarms (from 22.9% to 29.5%); the hit rate stayed
constant (68.2% vs. 68.1%), a finding consistent with the effects of
PI.
Experiment 2b. For the purposes of analysis, the randomized
blocks were also divided into 10-trial mini-blocks. Mean accuracy
is given in Figure 4. In the blocked condition, accuracy on trial 1
(the low-PI condition) was significantly higher than on trial 10 (the
high-PI condition; (t(19)=2.44, p=.02), replicating Experiment
2a. As in Experiment 2a, this was due to an increase in false alarms
(19.2% to 27.7%) rather than a decrease in hits (75.9% to 76.0%).
In the randomized condition, accuracy on trial one was non-
significantly lower than on trial ten (t(19)=1.29, p=.21). A 262
repeated-measures ANOVA on blocked/randomized vs. low-
interference/high-interference revealed a significant interaction (F(1,
19)=6.53, p=.02).
Combined. It is unlikely that PI causes performance to fall
continuously, but from the data so far reported, it is not clear if
and where performance asymptotes as PI builds.
Figure 5 plots average performance across the ten trials of the
‘‘mini-blocks,’’ averaging over Experiment 2a and the blocked
condition of Experiment 2b. Results for the experiments
individually were roughly similar. From the plot, it appears that
the decline in performance levels off within no more than 5 or 6
trials. This corresponds well with the results of Experiment 1, in
which item-specific PI appeared to decay entirely within 4 or 5
trials.
Experiment 3: Results
Results from Experiment 3a are shown in Figure 6. Accuracy in
the first trial (high-novelty condition) and last trial (low-novelty condition)
was nearly identical. The difference was not significant (t(19)=.09,
p=.93).
Results from Experiment 3b are shown in Figure 6. Experiment
3b was stopped after testing ten participants because it was clear
that the effect was if anything in the wrong direction for the
attentional hypothesis. Accuracy in the first trial (refreshed condition) was
somewhat lower than in the last trial (fatigued condition), a difference
that was not significant (t(19)=1.14, p=.28)–opposite from the
predictions of the attentional hypothesis.
Experiments 3a and 3b thus fail to confirm the attentional
hypothesis. That is, they suggest that the results of Experiments 2a
and 2b were not due merely to increased novelty at the beginning
of each mini-block, leading to participants paying more attention
Figure 4. Accuracy (with standard errors) for the first trial (low proactive interference) and last trial (high proactive interference) of
each mini-block in Experiments 2a and 2b (note that the in Experiment 2b, the first and tenth trials are both low proactive
interference trials).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002716.g004
Visual Proactive Interference
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 July 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 7 | e2716on those trials. In Experiment 3a, the monotonous onward
march of trials within 100-trial blocks was broken up by
switching the color of the stimuli. In Experiment 3b, a short rest
was inserted between every 10 trials of the 100-trial blocks.
Although either or both of these manipulations should have
recaptured the participant’s attention, if in fact attention was
wandering, neither manipulation was sufficient to increase
accuracy on the first trial of each mini-block. While it may be
that only switching the stimulus set is sufficient to recapture
attention enough to cause a boost in accuracy, it is not clear how
that would be de-confounded from PI or whether that is in fact
different from PI.
Experiment 4: Results
In order to facilitate comparison with Experiment 2, Cowan’s K
for the first 10 trials only are shown in Figure 7 (the results from
the subsequent trials are interesting but outside the scope of the
present paper; they will be presented in a future paper currently in
preparation). The pattern of results for accuracy is qualitatively
similar.
Cowan’s K dropped by 12.1% from the first trial to the 10
th,a
smaller change than that in Experiment 2, but one of a roughly
similar degree. This difference is significant in a McNemar test on
accuracy (x
2=18.45, p,.001; no tests are possible on Cowan’s K,
because here it cannot be calculated individually for each
participant). This confirms that although PI has a statistically
significant impact on measured visual WM capacity, it does not
affect capacity enough to explain away the differences between
measured visual and verbal WM capacity.
The fact that the results of this experiment agree so well with
those of the in-lab experiment is further evidence that Web-based
experiments can be reliable sources of data.
Figure 5. The decline in estimated WM capacity in terms of Cowan’s K (with standard errors) as a function of trial number within the
‘‘mini-blocks’’ of Experiment 2a and the blocked condition of Experiment 2b. N=41.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002716.g005
Figure 6. Mean accuracy (with standard errors) for Experiments 3a and 3b, trials 1 and 10 of each mini-block.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002716.g006
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There are a few details from the above results that deserve some
discussion before turning to the larger questions in this study.
All the Cowan’s Ks reported above are well below the
standardly-claimed 3–4 object capacity of visual WM. However,
this is not without precedent, having been reported for many types
of stimuli in the past [2,5]. One explanation is that capacity may
be less for more complex objects [2], though recent evidence also
suggests that the ease of discriminating no-match probes from the
memory items also plays a role [3]. This latter point may suggest
that probe-based WM tests are not so much measures of the
number of items that can be stored, but of the number of items
that can be stored with enough fidelity to discriminate them from
the probe. This is either appropriate or inappropriate depending
on how it compares to how WM is actually used ‘‘in the wild,’’ an
issue which may not have received enough attention. It should be
noted that verbal WM capacity outstrips visual WM capacity in
probe-based tasks also [43], so this caveat about discriminability is
somewhat tangential to my present purposes.
In Experiment 2b, it is interesting to note that performance on
the low-PI randomized blocks was intermediate between perfor-
mance on the first and last trials of each mini-block on the blocked
blocks. This may be due to the fact that average PI on the first trial
of a blocked mini-block (in which that stimuli type had not been
viewed on average for 50 trials) was lower than on any given trial
of the randomized blocks (in which, due to how the randomization
was done, stimuli of that type had probably been seen more
recently). Thus, looking at the first trial that uses a particular set of
stimuli may give the cleanest measure of visual WM capacity.
It is worth comparing these results to two previous studies that
used a similar design [28,29]. The authors presented participants
with a WM task similar to those used here. As in Experiment 2,
there were short blocks of trials in which the same stimulus set was
used. From block to block, the stimulus set varied. Unlike the
present study, different stimulus sets included visual objects,
locations and also visually-presented verbal material (e.g., names
of flowers). Also, the authors reported reaction times (RTs), not
accuracy. There were several different experiments, which differed
in terms of the length of the blocks and whether there were breaks
between blocks.
In the several different experiments, the authors found
consistent results: RTs were fastest on the first trial of the block,
increased through the 3
rd or 5
th trial, and then quickly fell again to
a very noisy intermediate level. This contrasts with the accuracy
data here, where performance did not recover, though this may be
a difference between accuracy and reaction time. Although it is
not clear in all their experiments how many trials were used, where
the number of trials is reported, it is considerably fewer than the
600 trials used here. So it is also possible that their data was simply
less robust. Furthermore, since they did not break down their data
into verbal stimuli and visual stimuli, it is not known whether their
effect at the later trials was due differentially to one or the other.
However, if RT and accuracy do in fact dissociate in these
experiments, that may be worth further exploration.
General Discussion
One of the most salient results from research in visual WM is its
severely limited capacity [2,33,44]. It remains an open question
the degree to which these measured limitations are experimental
artifact. Certainly, variation in experimental design can dramat-
ically affect measured capacity [3]. Given that typical visual WM
capacity studies invite a great deal of proactive interference (PI),
one possibility was that PI was artificially depressing capacity
measures.
The results of the present study suggest that while PI certainly
plays a role in visual WM performance, it does not dramatically
change WM capacity estimates–at least for these sorts of stimuli
and in these sorts of tasks. In Experiment 1, item-specific visual PI
was estimated to reach asymptote within 4–5 trials. In Experiment
2, the combined effect of item-specific visual PI and item-
nonspecific visual PI on measured visual WM capacity was
estimated at a 17% reduction in capacity. A similar number (12%)
was found in Experiment 4, which used a cleaner low-PI baseline.
Experiment 3 eliminated some methodological concerns about
Experiments 2 and 4.
Thus, I cannot reject the twin hypotheses that (1) visual WM’s
severely limited capacity is due to experimental artifact, and (2)
visual WM’s limited capacity in relation to verbal WM is
experimental artifact.
There are many other ways in which experimental artifact could
be playing a role, and those remain to be tested. For instance, Awh
and colleagues have demonstrated that for typical visual WM tasks
(like those employed here), the degree of discriminability of the
stimuli can have a massive effect on performance, which can serve
to dramatically decrease measured visual WM capacity [3]. This
Figure 7. Cowan’s K for the first 10 trials of Experiment 4 (error bars are not displayed because Cowan’s K cannot be calculated for
individual participants, who either got each item correct or incorrect).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002716.g007
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which do not use probes and thus do not require similar
discrimination.
At least two directions of research could address this potential
confound. One would be to systematically compare verbal and
visual WM capacity using the probe method. In fact, researchers
since Sternberg have probed verbal WM with this task [43]. In
Sternberg’s original paper, he found ceiling accuracy for the probe
task even when six words were being maintained in WM–well
beyond any reports for visual WM capacity. (I am assuming that,
although the digits were presented visually, they were maintained
in verbal memory. This may require testing.) However, it may be
necessary to carefully equate discriminability for both the visual
and the verbal stimuli in order to make a direct comparison.
The other direction would be to test visual WM with the full-
report paradigm. This is very similar to what Zhang and Simon
pioneered [16]. However, it is not clear whether this paradigm can
be readily extended beyond Chinese characters. Even within
Chinese characters, it will be a non-trivial task to control the
stimuli on every possible relevant factor (visual complexity,
discriminability, familiarity, ease-of-naming, etc.).
There are other potential methodological confounds as well. For
instance, in verbal WM tasks, sensory information (e.g., pitch,
tenor, prosody) can typically be discarded as irrelevant. However,
visual WM tasks often focus on specifically sensory aspects of the
stimuli (e.g., size, color; I thank Johan Lauwereyns for this
suggestion).
Should all methodological issues be addressed and the
differences between visual and verbal WM capacity remain, the
answer to this puzzle must be found in the nature of the human
memory system itself. There are several intriguing possibilities.
WM capacity is greater for words than non-words [45], and
relatively little familiarization is required to increase capacity for
non-words [31]. In contrast, long-term memory traces have little
to no impact on visual WM [1,13,14,15]. Similarly, while explicit
strategies have been known to improve verbal WM capacity by an
order of magnitude [9,10], there are no such reports for visual
WM. However, the literature on the role of long-term memory or
explicit strategies in visual WM capacity is limited, and it does not
appear any systematic comparison with verbal WM has been
attempted. Moreover, even if visual and verbal WM capacity
differences can be reduced to differences in strategy use or the
impact of long-term memory, that will only raise the question of
why visual WM lacks these features.
Thus, more research on these questions is needed.
One purpose of this study was to investigate the reliability of the
strangely small visual WM capacity estimates reported in the
literature. Another was to further investigate the nature of
proactive interference (PI) in visual WM. PI has only been very
recently described in visual WM [17,28,34,35], and thus much
about its nature is not understood, including how it compares with
verbal PI. One recent study found inconsistent results across
stimulus types and modalities, both behaviorally and with
neuroimaging [28]. Moreover, Mecklinger, Weber, Gunter and
Engle [34] found that while participants with large verbal WM
capacity do not show significant verbal PI (as predicted, since the
two are inversely correlated), they do show significant PI for
abstract objects, suggesting that resistance to PI for verbal stimuli
may not perfectly predict resistance to PI for visual stimuli.
Thus, the present study contributes to the understanding of
visual WM PI in the following ways. First, it replicates previous
claims of its existence using a variety of visual stimuli (Experiments
2). Second, I was able to measure PI on the first several trials using
novel stimuli (Experiment 4), something which has been done for
verbal materials [24,26,46] but was not previously accomplished
for visual materials due to the large samples required. This serves
as continuing evidence that Web-based experimentation is a
powerful technique for testing hypotheses difficult to test in a
traditional lab-based setting.
I also showed that, using the recent probes paradigm, one can
find evidence of item-specific visual PI across at least 3 trials and a
dozen seconds (in fact, in another experiment not presented here, I
found that visual PI decays as a function of the number of
intervening stimuli, not the passage of time).
Nearly all other investigations of item-specific PI consider only
probes most recently seen on trial N-1. The only other study
comparable to Experiment 1 that I know of is Monsell [36]. In that
study of verbal WM, reaction times were longer and false alarms
more frequent for probes most recently presented on trial N-2 than
N-4 and N-4 than N-6. This was significant in an omnibus F test,
but no pair-wise comparisons were reported, limiting any
conclusions. However, these results are in the same ballpark as
what I found for visual PI.
Moreover, Experiments 2 and 4 demonstrated that the
cumulative effects of item-specific and item-nonspecific PI reach
asymptote by the third to fifth trial, even under conditions
designed to promote PI. Experiments 3 ruled out the possibility
that these effects are due to observers paying more attention to
sudden changes in stimuli, a plausible counter-explanation to PI
which interestingly does not appear to have been tested previously
in the verbal or visual domains. A couple early studies appear to
suggest a similar asymptote for verbal PI as well [24,46].
Thus, visual and verbal PI–particularly item-specific PI–seem
similar in some respects, suggesting potentially a common
mechanism or at least two very similar mechanisms. However,
in an additional experiment, I found that increasing the retention
interval from 250 ms to 4300 ms did not affect PI, which contrasts
with reports that retention interval correlates positively with verbal
PI [24,46]. However, that study found this effect to be much
reduced for short retention intervals such as were used in the
present experiments. Thus, while this indicates a potential
difference between visual and verbal PI, it is far from conclusive.
The similarity and differences between visual and verbal PI may
help clarify models of memory. Here, I consider these results in
terms of two very recent accounts of PI.
Makovski & Jiang [17] seem to assume a multi-store model with
separate long-term and short-term components when they suggest
that item-specific PI is caused by inefficient removal of unneeded
items from the WM buffer [47]. Though a multi-store model could
accommodate identical behavioral signatures of visual and verbal
PI, such commonalities across the different WM buffers does not
seem necessary and would need to be explicated.
In contrast, Jonides and colleagues [48] provide some discussion
of PI in terms of a single-store model, in which WM is a set of
processes that activate long-term memory representations more or
less in situ (i.e., no separate buffer is involved). In their account, PI
operates through two possibly distinct mechanisms: (1) recent
exposure to similar items may increase the noise that affects the
fidelity of the representation of the current to-be-remembered item
causing memory decay, and (2) retrieval of an item from WM
requires reinstantiating its active firing pattern, which would be
subject to interference from similarly encoded patterns. Thus, the
Jonides et al. account more parsimoniously deals with similarities
between visual and verbal PI, since their account pertains to the
mechanisms of memory quite independent of modality.
A number of questions about visual PI remain open for the
future. Despite the importance of PI and WM, PI in visual WM
has received relatively little attention. In verbal WM, an
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with their verbal WM capacity [27]. However, it is not known
whether the same relationship is true for visual WM. Similarly,
verbal PI susceptibility appears to be a strong negative predictor of
general intelligence [49,50]. It is not know whether the same is
true for visual PI. Similarly important, recent structural equation
modeling work suggested that executive function may decompose
into two components: shifting/updating and resistance to PI [51],
but that study relied exclusively on tests of verbal PI.
Conclusion
Visual working memory capacity appears to be extremely
limited, though a number of potential confounds have not been
eliminated. One potential confound, an out-sized effect of
proactive interference, has been eliminated. However, more work
is left to be done.
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